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Abstract—Recent research has shown that the integrity of
sensor measurements can be violated through out-of-band signal
injection attacks. These attacks target the conversion process
from a physical quantity to an analog property—a process that
fundamentally cannot be authenticated. Out-of-band signal in-
jection attacks thus pose previously-unexplored security risks by
exploiting hardware imperfections in the sensors themselves, or
in their interfaces to microcontrollers. In response to the growing-
yet-disjointed literature in the subject, this article presents the
first survey of out-of-band signal injection attacks. It focuses on
unifying their terminology and identifying commonalities in their
causes and effects through a chronological, evolutionary, and
thematic taxonomy of attacks. By highlighting cross-influences
between different types of out-of-band signal injections, this
paper underscores the need for a common language irrespective
of the attack method. By placing attack and defense mechanisms
in the wider context of their dual counterparts of side-channel
leakage and electromagnetic interference, this study identifies
common threads and gaps that can help guide and inform
future research. Overall, the ever-increasing reliance on sensors
embedded in everyday commodity devices necessitates that a
stronger focus be placed on improving the security of such
systems against out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Index Terms—Out-of-Band, Signal Injections, Hardware Im-
perfections, Mixed-Signal Systems, Survey, Attacks and Defenses
I. INTRODUCTION
MATHEMATICALLY secure algorithms can be brokenin practice due to a mismatch between the high-level
system model used for analysis and the real-world environment
on which code runs. For example, data-dependent electromag-
netic, optical, and acoustic emanations, as well as variations in
power consumption can reveal the information processed by a
device [1], with or without the help of intentional faults [2]–
[4]. However, attacks exploiting hardware imperfections are
not limited to side-channel leakage of confidential data: recent
research has shown that it is possible to target the integrity of
sensor measurements in a similar out-of-band fashion.
These out-of-band signal injection attacks can be performed
using electromagnetic radiation exploiting circuits unintention-
ally acting as receiver antennas [5]–[7], as well as optical [8],
[9] and acoustic [10]–[12] emissions targeting flaws in the
conversion process from physical properties into electrical
ones. The systems attacked have been equally diverse, and
include medical devices [5], drones [10], [13], hard drives [12]
and cameras [14], among others. However, despite the wide
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range of attack methods and devices targeted, research in the
field thus far has been disjointed.
The ad-hoc nature of this type of research might stem, in
part, from the fact that out-of-band signal injection attacks
have so far only been (openly) conducted in a lab environment.
However, out-of-band attacks have still garnered the interest of
technological and mainstream news publications outside of the
academic community [15]–[20]. They have even prompted na-
tional agencies to issue Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(CERT) advisories [21]. In some cases, the effects of out-of-
band attacks can be fatal: for instance, Foo Kune et al. have
demonstrated that low-power attacker signals can trick cardiac
implantable electrical devices into causing pacing inhibition
and defibrillation shocks [5]. Although the techniques used are
not identical to those of mass-produced sonic repellents [22] or
commercial [23] and military [24] jammers, out-of-band signal
injection attacks share the same potential for weaponization.
As a result, to bring attention to these potentially severe issues,
and to help designers better protect future hardware devices,
this study conducts the first comprehensive survey of out-of-
band signal injection attacks.
A. Survey Scope
This article focuses on out-of-band signal injection attacks,
which target the connections between sensors, actuators, and
microcontrollers, or exploit imperfections in the hardware
itself. Although the term is defined precisely in Section II,
we note here a few key features of the attacks investigated in
this survey. The first property of out-of-band signal injection
attacks is that they aim to change values processed by a
system, rather than infer them. This fact distinguishes them
from the side-channel [1] and fault-injection attacks [2]–[4]
mentioned in the introduction.
The second feature is that out-of-band attacks do not change
the measured quantity itself. For instance, using electromag-
netic signals to change the audio recorded by a microphone [5]
is an example of an out-of-band signal injection attack, but
heating a temperature sensor with an open flame is not.
The final characteristic highlights the physical aspect of out-
of-band signal injection attacks. In other words, the attacks
studied in this paper alter sensor measurements or actuator
inputs at the hardware layer instead of the protocol layer.
As a result, spoofing attacks of unauthenticated, digital com-
munication interfaces are out-of-scope. For example, wireless
transmissions can be used to spoof the pressure of car tires
and trigger warning lights [25], alter the flow of insulin
injections [26], or change pacemaker settings to deliver shock
commands with implantable cardiac defibrillators [27]. How-
ever, because these interfaces can easily be protected with
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2cryptography, they are not considered in this survey. For
similar reasons, jamming, e.g., train signal controls [28], or
over-powering legitimate GPS signals [29] are out-of-scope
because they rely on intentional communication interfaces. As
a result, they do not exploit hardware imperfections, instead
relying on high-power, in-band electromagnetic transmissions.
Finally, relay attacks on LiDARs, radars, and sonars [9], [14],
[30]–[32] are also not out-of-band signal injection attacks. This
is because, in order to spoof the distance between the attacker
and the victim, they depend on winning a race between the
adversarial signal and the true reflected pulses.
That said, these related research areas can offer invaluable
insight into novel injection techniques and possible counter-
measures. As a result, cross-disciplinary connections are made
throughout this work, but with a clear focus on how they
impact out-of-band signal injection attacks and defenses.
B. Contributions & Organization
Despite the growing literature in the area and extensive
parallels between prior work in hardware security research
and out-of-band signal injection attacks and defenses, no other
article has made these connections explicit, or traced their
evolution through time, theme, or approach. Our survey fills
these gaps through the following contributions:
1) It unifies the diverse terminology used by different
works (Section II) and summarizes the threat model
(Section III) to create a common language through
which to discuss attack and defense mechanisms.
2) It proposes the first chronological and thematic evolution
of out-of-band signal injection attacks (Section VIII),
which highlights cross-influences between electromag-
netic (Section IV), conducted (Section V), acoustic
(Section VI), and other (Section VII) attacks.
3) It creates a taxonomy of countermeasures introduced to
prevent and detect out-of-band attacks (Section IX).
4) It places attacks and defenses in the wider context of
side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference
attacks (Section X). Using these insights, this study
identifies gaps in the experimental approach of published
research, and proposes concrete steps to overcome these
challenges in the future (Section XI).
II. CHOICE OF TERMINOLOGY
The terms used to describe the numerous acoustic, elec-
tromagnetic, and optical attacks on sensor-to-microcontroller
and microcontroller-to-actuator interfaces have so far been
inconsistent, with some works not even naming the attacks
at all [33], [34]. This section sets out to identify and unify
the nomenclature used as a first step towards providing a
common language through which to compare the various
works. As the threat model (Section III) and the causes of
vulnerability (Section VIII) will reveal, the commonalities in
the attack techniques highlight a need for an all-encompassing
term irrespective of the method of injection. In other words,
although some of the more restrictive terms are appropriate for
describing specific attacks, we find that doing so can can hide
potential insights that arise from considering different types of
attacks jointly. The term we have chosen for this unification
is out-of-band signal injection attacks:
Definition 1 (Out-of-Band Signal Injection Attacks). Out-of-
band signal injection attacks are adversarial manipulations
of interfaces not intended for communication involving sen-
sors/actuators that cause a mismatch between the true physical
property being measured/acted upon and its digitized version.
To motivate our definition, the term injection was chosen
because it captures the fact that values reported by a system
are altered; it is not channel-specific; and it has already been
adopted by different works [5], [11], [13], [35]–[44]. The
out-of-band qualifier is necessary to distinguish the attacks
studied in this survey from signal injection attacks on sensors
using pulse reflections such as LiDARs [9], [14], [31], signal
injection attacks on the physical layer of communication
protocols [45], and false data injection attacks [28], [46]. As
explained in Section I-A, these attacks are out-of-scope, as
they do not depend on hardware vulnerabilities, but instead
use external communication interfaces.
By contrast, our term captures attacks which target in-
terfaces using signals outside of their intended frequency
of operation. It includes ultraviolet or infrared light against
cameras which should only be recording the visible part of the
spectrum, and ultrasonic injections against microphones meant
to be recording only audible sounds: these attacks transmit
signals that are literally outside the operational band. It also
includes electromagnetic signals against systems without any
(intentional) antennas, and acoustic attacks against gyroscopes
and accelerometers: these are also out-of-band, since they
inject signals through channels other than the ones used by the
sensor to measure the physical property. Our use of the out-
of-band modifier is therefore consistent with the definition for
out-of-band covert communication [47]. It has also recently
been used by Tu et al. [43] to describe acoustic attacks on
inertial sensors, further motivating its choice in this survey.
It should be noted that earlier work [31], [48] has proposed
a subdivision of signal injections attacks into regular-channel
attacks, which target the sensor structure itself by “using the
same type of physical quantity sensed”, transmission-channel
attacks, which target the connection between the sensor output
and the measurement setup, and side-channel attacks, where
the sensors themselves are targeted, but “by physical stimuli
other than those they are supposed to sense”. We do not
adopt this categorization, as it generally follows the medium of
injection (optical, electromagnetic, and acoustic respectively).
Moreover, regular-channel attacks are usually in-band, while
side-channel attacks have an overloaded meaning.
We similarly find (intentional) interference [5], [10], [12],
[36], [38], [40], [42], [49] to be unsuitable as a term because:
(a) it does not make it clear that the attackers can in some cases
inject waveforms of their choosing; and (b) Intentional Elec-
tromagnetic Interference (IEMI) has an established meaning
in Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) literature [50], [51].
As Section X indicates, IEMI attacks often use high-power,
destructive transmissions, and therefore have a different aim
than out-of-band signal injection attacks.
The term (sensor) spoofing [8], [9], [14], [43] was also
3TABLE I: Terminology used by different works to describe
out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Terminology Example References
Injection [5], [13], [35], [38], [41]–[44]
Intentional Interference [5], [10], [12], [36], [38], [40], [42], [49]
Non-Linearity [11], [54], [55], [68]
Spoofing [8], [9], [14], [43]
Other (See Text) [7], [53], [67]
avoided for similar reasons: it has an overloaded meaning
in authentication contexts and with in-band signal injection
attacks [6], [52]. Moreover, it does not capture the physical
aspect of injections, and does not accurately describe coarse-
grained attacks which lead to saturation of a sensor.
Other terms used have been specific to the particular channel
which is being exploited, including induction attacks [7],
acoustic resonance [53], and (acoustic) non-linearity [11],
[54], [55]. Such terms were not selected because they are
channel-specific, and focus on the mechanism of the attack,
rather than the effect. Similarly, methodology-inspired terms
which have been avoided include Radio Frequency Injection
(RFI), Direct Power Injection (DPI), and other terminology
that arises in immunity or susceptibility literature against (non-
adversarial) electromagnetic interference (EMI) [56]–[66].
Finally, the term transduction attacks, proposed by Fu and
Xu [67] to mean attacks which “exploit a vulnerability in the
physics of a sensor to manipulate its output or induce inten-
tional errors” has not yet received mainstream recognition. It
also does not necessarily make it clear that the attack may
target the interface between the sensor and the rest of the
system, instead of just the sensor itself. The various terms
which have been used to describe out-of-band signal injection
attacks are shown in Table I, along with example references.
Since the majority of attacks in the literature are on sensors
rather than actuators, we will refer to both of them collectively
as sensors for brevity, and will distinguish between the two
only when it is necessary to do so, i.e., when there is a
divergence in the attack methodology.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
Systems depend on sensors and actuators to interface with
their external environment. They therefore require a conversion
of a physical property (e.g., temperature or speed) to or from
an electrical quantity (such as voltage or resistance). This
electrical measurement is typically analog in nature, and is
digitized by an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) before
it is processed. Although modern cryptography has mostly
solved the problem of secure communication between digital
interfaces, there is no way to authenticate the measurement
itself, or the analog component of the connection between
the sensor or actuator and a microcontroller. This lack of
authentication, coupled with hardware imperfections, can be
exploited for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Conceptually, the sensor, the ADC, and the microcontroller
perform logically distinct functions, but all three can be
fully encapsulated into the same Integrated Circuit (IC) chip.
Although this chip presents a digital interface to third parties,
Fig. 1: System model for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Remote and conducted adversarial electromagnetic emana-
tions, optical emissions, and acoustic waves can attack the
sensors themselves, or the interfaces connecting sensors to mi-
crocontrollers through Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs).
which can be protected by cryptographic protocols, the sensor
itself can still be vulnerable to out-of-band signal injection
attacks. For example, acoustic attacks targeting the resonant
frequencies of gyroscopes and accelerometers have proven to
be effective even against digital ICs [10], [13], [43].
As explained in Section II, attackers are not allowed to
manipulate the property being measured itself (e.g., the ra-
diation being measured by a Geiger counter): in the language
of Shoukry et al. [69], the property measured itself is trusted,
although the measurement itself is not. Nonetheless, attackers
are allowed to transmit signals outside of the limits being
sensed, which are still interpreted as valid measurements. For
example, an attacker can produce ultrasound waves which are
picked up by a microphone recording human speech [11],
[54], [55], or shine infrared (IR) light into a camera capturing
the visible part of the spectrum [14]. However, attacking a
microphone with audible sound, or a camera with visible light
is not allowed under this threat model, since the attacker
is manipulating the property being sensed in-band. A sec-
ondary goal for some attacks is therefore undetectability or
concealment [69]. Attacks also need to be non-invasive [69],
and preclude direct physical access to the system under
attack. It should be noted that different attack techniques have
different distance requirements, with electromagnetic attacks
theoretically having a longer range compared to optical and
acoustic attacks. We defer the discussion of distance and
related considerations to Section XI.
Figure 1 summarizes the channels that have successfully
been exploited in the literature thus far. Some of the out-of-
band signal injection attacks use electromagnetic (EM) waves
to penetrate the wires connecting sensors and microcontrollers
(Section IV), or the power circuit of the device (Section V).
The same effects can sometimes also be achieved through
shared power lines (conducted attacks). Finally, other attacks
may target the sensors themselves through sound (Section VI),
and alternative means such as infrared light (Section VII).
The effectiveness of different attacks, however, has mostly
been evaluated in a qualitative fashion so far (e.g., whether
the system was tricked into performing an action or not).
Recent research, however, has attempted to mathematically
define security against out-of-band signal injection attacks, and
therefore quantify their success [44]. Specifically, Giechaskiel
4Fig. 2: Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) model: non-
linearities due to Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protection
diodes and amplifiers (e.g., comparators) counteract low-pass
filtering effects of the sample-and-hold mechanism and can
unintentionally demodulate high-frequency input signals.
et al. [44] introduced probabilistic definitions which attempt
to capture the fidelity with which an adversary can make a
target waveform appear at the input of the microcontroller
of Figure 1. These definitions address both coarse-grained
attacks which merely disrupt sensor measurements and fine-
grained attacks with precise waveform injections. Although
the definitions abstract away from specific hardware consider-
ations, they still model the discrepancy between an adversary’s
target waveforms and the actual signal transmitted, which is
necessary due to the behavior of the underlying circuits.
The specific circuit properties that allow adversarial signals
to be injected into a device vary with the injection method
and module targeted. For example, EM attacks typically
depend on unintentional antennas in Printed Circuit Board
(PCB) traces [5], while acoustic attacks exploit resonance
in gyroscopes [10] and accelerometers [13]. As each attack
exploits unique properties of the target device, the details of
specific hardware imperfections in sensors and other modules
are only expanded upon in subsequent sections. This section
instead discusses common features of different attacks at a
high level. One of these commonalities is that the vulnerability
of systems to out-of-band signal injection attacks depends on
both: (a) how adversarial signals are received by the devices
under attack; and (b) how these signals are digitized.
Giechaskiel et al. [44] recently proposed a general circuit
model which uses two transfer functions to separate these two
aspects of vulnerability. The first transfer function describes
circuit-specific transformations that an adversarial signal un-
dergoes. For example, for EM attacks, these transformations
include the (unintentional) low-power, low-gain antenna-like
behavior of PCB traces connecting sensors to ADCs [5], [44].
The second transfer function, on the other hand, is ADC-
specific, and summarizes the artifacts of the digitization pro-
cess. These two transfer functions dictate that for a successful
injection, attacker signals typically need to be transmitted
over high-frequency carriers, and be demodulated into low-
frequency, meaningful waveforms. According to the work of
Giechaskiel et al., components within ADCs are the culprits
for these demodulation effects [44]. The main constituents of
an ADC that contribute to its demodulation characteristics are
therefore summarized in Figure 2.
According to Pelgrom, an ADC uses three basic components
to convert analog signals into digital ones: a “sample- or track-
and-hold circuit where the sampling takes place, the digital-
to-analog converter and a level-comparison mechanism” [70].
Level-comparison amplifiers contribute to the demodulation
properties of ADCs [44] due to non-linear distortions, includ-
ing harmonics and intermodulation products [71].
Harmonics are responsible for producing “spectral compo-
nents at multiples of the fundamental [input] frequency” [71].
As an example, for a sinusoidal of angular frequency ω = 2pi f ,
harmonics transform the input vin = vˆ · sin(ωt) into:
vout =
(
a2vˆ2
2
+
3a4vˆ4
8
+ · · ·
)
+
(
a1vˆ+
3a3vˆ3
4
+ · · ·
)
sin(ωt)
−
(
a2vˆ2
2
+
a4vˆ4
2
+ · · ·
)
cos(2ωt)+ · · · (1)
As Equation (1) shows, the output also contains a Direct
Current (DC) component, which depends solely on the “even-
order nonlinear behavior” [71] of the system.
DC shifts can also be the result of reverse-biased diodes at
the input of an ADC. These diodes protect the circuit from
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) by clamping negative voltages
to ground, and inputs exceeding the maximum allowed voltage
to Vcc . This behavior of ESD diodes can cause a (non-linear)
DC shift [71], which attackers can also exploit [7].
Intermodulation distortions, on the other hand, arise when
the input signal contains signals of two different frequencies.
For example, a sum of two sinusoidals vin = vˆ1 · sin(ω1t)+ vˆ2 ·
sin(ω2t) may represent an adversarial signal laid on top of the
legitimate sensor signal [44]. Non-linearities and trigonometric
identities would then dictate that the output signal contains
frequencies of the form nω1 ± mω2 for integers n,m. As
Giechaskiel et al. note, both types of “non-linearities demod-
ulate attacker waveforms, even when they are modulated on
high-frequency carriers” [44]. This fact makes them crucial
for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
The final component of ADCs which is relevant to the
adversarial injections studied in this article is the sample-
and-hold circuitry shown in Figure 2. In its simplest form,
the sample-and-hold mechanism consists of a resistor and a
capacitor (RC circuit) connected to the input of the ADC.
The transfer function of the voltage across the capacitor
is therefore HS/H ( jω) = 11+jωRC . This dictates that as the
angular frequency ω increases, the gain GS/H = 1√
1+(ωRC)2
is reduced [44]. To put it differently, the sample-and-hold
mechanism acts as a low-pass filter, counteracting the aliasing
effect, which occurs when input signals are faster than half
the sampling rate of the ADC (Nyquist frequency). One would
expect this filtering behavior to reduce the vulnerability of
systems to out-of-band signal injection attacks. However, the
filter’s cutoff frequency in practice “is often much higher than
the sampling rate of the ADC” [44], necessitating additional
anti-aliasing filters before the ADC input [70].
Overall, imperfections in the sensors themselves, the ADCs,
or the connections between them can result in high-frequency
signals being interpreted as meaningful low-frequency ones.
As modulation over high-frequency signals is often neces-
sary to enter the targeted circuit [5], [44], the demodulation
properties of ADCs allow remote attackers without physical
access to inject signals into a system in an out-of-band fashion.
5The subsequent sections discuss these imperfections in greater
detail, with a focus on the specific method of injection.
IV. ELECTROMAGNETIC TRANSMISSIONS
The antenna-like behavior of wires and traces is extensively
studied in the fields of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
and Electromagnetic Immunity. This is done to ensure interop-
erability between the various household electrical appliances,
by guaranteeing that devices neither cause nor are susceptible
to undue interference [72]. Such research has shown an inverse
relationship between the length of microstrip PCB traces and
the frequencies at which the traces are resonant [73]. However,
to better predict the response of PCB traces to external EM
fields, many additional parameters are important in practice.
For instance, “field incidence, polarization angles, and the
magnitude and phase of the impedances loading the microstrip
terminations” [74] are all useful in modeling trace behavior.
Although going into the details of such antenna models is
outside the scope of this article, the effects of unintentional
antennas have been central in the security community. Until
now, unintentional transmitting antennas have been key for
side-channel analysis: data-dependent emissions can reveal the
information processed by a device to a remote attacker [75].
However, wires conversely acting as unintentional receiving
antennas have only become a focal point of research more re-
cently: out-of-band signal injection attacks have demonstrated
that the antenna-like behavior of wires between sensors and
microcontrollers can result in adversarial EM signals being
interpreted as legitimate measurements.
As the systems targeted are not intended for communication,
the phenomenon is known as back-door coupling [5], [76]–
[79]. In back-door coupling, the “radiation couples through
imperfections (apertures) in an electromagnetic shield, giving
rise to a diffuse and complex field pattern within the shielded
structure” [76]. Consequently, predicting the susceptibility of
systems against back-door coupling is a hard task “without
detailed testing, although properties averaged over frequency
bands can be predicted” [80]. In other words, although the
resonant behavior of simple geometric structures (e.g., lines
and rectangles) has been extensively studied [81], extensive
experiments are necessary to identify the extent to which
intermodulation products appear [79]. Such products of diodes
and other non-linear components can act as potential envelope
detectors causing systems to take the wrong safety-critical
actions [5]. As a result, these effects are a concern for more
than just compliance with EMC regulations.
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) are an example of a
safety-critical system where external electromagnetic interfer-
ence (EMI) can cause physical harm to people. As a result,
there is extensive research on the EMI behavior of various
IMDs [82]–[94]. Some of these works have even pinpointed
the properties of “non-linear circuit elements” in pacemakers
as the culprits for demodulating RF signals produced by cell
phones [86], [95]. However, the consequences of intentional
out-of-band electromagnetic signal injection attacks on IMDs
were only first identified in 2009 by Rasmussen et al. in the
context of a distance-bounding protocol [33].
The proposed protocol used ultrasound transmissions to
place guarantees on the distance between two communicating
parties, but it was determined that an EM signal could “induce
a current in the audio receiver circuit just as if the IMD
received a sound signal” [33]. This would break protocol
properties which depend on the speed of sound constant:
adversarial transmissions propagating at the speed of light
allow an adversary to operate from a longer distance. This
attack is perhaps the first out-of-band electromagnetic sig-
nal injection, since it utilized EM emanations to attack an
ultrasound-based protocol: unintentional antennas were found
on the path “from the reception circuit to the piezo element”,
which was effectively “working as a microphone” [33].
Although the attack by Rasmussen et al. was more of a side-
note to an otherwise-secure protocol [33], Foo Kune et al.’s
seminal 2013 “Ghost Talk” paper [5] made such adversarial
injections the focal point of research. It showed that EM emis-
sions could affect Electrocardiogram (ECG) measurements and
cause IMDs to deliver fatal defibrillation shocks [5]. Foo Kune
et al. succeeded in injecting arbitrary analog measurements,
making a marked improvement in the literature compared
to coarse replay and jamming attacks on IMDs [26], [27],
[96], [97]. Their approach also significantly differed from
high-power Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)
leading to the transient upset or destruction of commercial
equipment [50], [76]–[78], [98]–[103].
The attack on IMDs by Foo Kune et al. [5] used low-power
(≤ 10W), low-frequency (kHz range) EM signals which cou-
pled to the leads of ECGs and Cardiac Implantable Electrical
Devices (CIEDs). In the open air, the distance achieved was
up to 1.67m, but when submerging the devices in saline (to
approximate the composition of the human body), successful
attacks were limited to less than 10cm. The signals emitted
targeted the baseband (i.e., the frequency of operation) of the
IMDs directly, and thus did not make use of the non-linearities
identified above and in Section III. However, this attack should
still be considered out-of-band, as the IMD leads were meant
to require physical contact for measurements, and should not
be reacting to remote electromagnetic transmissions. In other
words, this attack is more akin to coupling to a multimeter’s
probes to cause wrong voltage readings remotely, rather than
causing interference to a WiFi device by transmitting at
2.4GHz: although both require external stimuli, the mode of
injection is different from the intended mode of operation.
Foo Kune et al. also conducted out-of-band attacks against
webcams and bluetooth headsets that were up to 1m away
from an 80mW source [5]. The authors transmitted modu-
lated signals over high-frequency carriers (in the hundreds of
MHz) that make use of unintentional antennas on the path
between the microphone and the amplifier. Non-linearities then
demodulated the input signals and produced intelligible audio
output. This output overpowered legitimate conversations via
the headset and fooled music identification services as well as
automated dial-in services (by emulating key presses via mod-
ulated Dual Tone Multiple Frequency (DTMF) signals) [5].
Kasmi and Lopes Esteves similarly targeted smartphone
microphones, but with a goal of triggering voice commands
(e.g., “OK Google”, “Hey Siri”) by emitting Amplitude-
6Fig. 3: Basic operating principle of an electromagnetic out-of-
band signal injection attack against a microphone. Amplitude-
Modulated (AM) signals are transmitted using an antenna,
and are picked up (and attenuated) by headphone cables or
PCB traces. Non-linearities in amplifiers coupled with low-
pass filters remove the carrier wave and down-convert the
target signal. The demodulated signal can be used to break
ultrasound protocols [33], fool music services [5], or inject
voice commands [38], despite the additional noise introduced.
Modulated (AM) signals [38]. These signals get picked up
by the user’s hands-free headset, are then demodulated due to
non-linearities, and finally get executed by the software voice-
processing service. It is interesting to note that by default,
“a long hardware button press is required for launching the
service” [38]. However, a Frequency-Modulated (FM) signal
at the same frequency can also emulate this headphone button
press [38], allowing the attack to be fully carried out remotely.
The attack by Kasmi and Lopes Esteves used front-door
coupling, as the “radiation couples to equipment intended to
communicate or interact with the external environment” [76].
This is because headphones can be used as FM antennas and
can thus not be effectively shielded. It should be noted that the
field strength required was in the order of 25−30Vm−1, which
is close to the limit for human safety, and an order of magni-
tude higher than the required immunity level (3Vm−1) [38].
This illustrates that high powers might still be required for
reasonable attack distances: in a subsequent work, the authors
noted that their attack requires a power of 40W for a distance
of 2m, and 200W for a distance of 4m [40].
Figure 3 shows an example of an electromagnetic out-of-
band signal injection attack, which summarizes the attacks
against microphone sensors. It shows that the desired attacker
waveform w(t) needs to be modulated over a high-frequency
carrier c(t), so that the signal can be picked up with relatively
low attenuation by the victim device’s wires. For example,
amplitude modulation with a modulation depth 0 < µ ≤ 100%
can be used to couple to wired headphones. Through non-
linearities in the phone’s internal amplifier, as well as low-
pass filtering effects, the target waveform is preserved at the
output of the digital signal processing (DSP) chip. Although
this process introduces noise, the demodulated signal can
still be distinguished by online music services [5], imitate
voice-initiated commands, which are then executed by the
phone [38], or break protocol guarantees [33]. Although the
above works targeted microphones, out-of-band electromag-
netic signal injections are not sensor- or device-specific. For
example, subsequent sections discuss proof-of-concept EM-
based injections against temperature sensors [104], [105].
However, most attacks have primarily used amplitude mod-
ulation, leading to a question that has yet not been addressed:
Open Question 1: What is the optimal modulation
scheme for out-of-band electromagnetic signal injec-
tion attacks? In other words, can Frequency Modula-
tion (FM), Phase Modulation (φM), or other schemes
be used instead of Amplitude Modulation (AM)?
Another largely-unexplored research area is that of magnetic
emissions. Specifically, magnetic attacks had largely been
ignored in the literature, until Shoukry et al. demonstrated
that it is possible to confuse Anti-Lock Braking Systems
(ABS) [6]. This is done by exposing the magnetic-based wheel
speed sensors to an in-band attacker-generated magnetic field
at close proximity [6]. Doing so can alter speed measurements,
potentially veering cars off the road [6].
Although the work by Shoukry et al. is in-band and lim-
ited in distance, it inspired subsequent work in out-of-band
attacks: Selvaraj et al. recently conducted the first attacks on
actuators (rather than sensors) through EM transmissions [7].
Specifically, an unmodulated sawtooth waveform was chosen
to cause a “sharp decrease, for a very small amount of time” at
the target servo [7]. Because the servo is controlled using Pulse
Width Modulation (PWM), a waveform of the same frequency
(50Hz) therefore results in a one-way (clockwise) rotation.
This attack has a few limitations: changing the attacking
frequency to 60Hz causes the servo to “change positions
randomly” [7]. Moreover, relatively high powers are required:
a 10V (peak-to-peak) waveform is insufficient, so a 50W
amplifier and a 1-to-6 step-up transformer are necessary.
Moreover, one of the servo wires is wrapped around the
toroid transferring the EM signal. Although “the same effect
was observed when a length of the wire was placed within
a solenoid”, “producing an effect at a distance requires the
proper selection of a field directivity element” [7]:
Open Question 2: How can one precisely control an
actuator in both directions, and at a distance?
Selvaraj et al. additionally proposed an analytical model of
electromagnetic induction attacks for sensors and actuators,
with a focus on the magnetic rather than the electric field [7].
To support their model, they further conducted experiments
against General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins of micro-
controllers in analog and digital modes. They showed that
1.82W transmissions of unmodulated signals at frequencies
between 0−1000MHz can result in a DC offset, even when the
microcontroller is at a distance of up to 1m from the source.
This indicates that an adversary can successfully inject signals
over a wide range of frequencies, without having precisely
determined the resonance behavior of the system.
Selvaraj et al. [7] were only concerned with the average
power received and not time-dependent signals. This is in
contrast to work on the demodulating effects of amplifiers
7(Section V), which depends on inter-modulation products and
harmonics. Instead, ESD diodes were identified as the culprits
for the resulting DC offset, due to clipping non-linearities.
However, it is not clear whether the same methodology
can induce attacker-desired, time-varying waveforms through
modulated (in amplitude or otherwise) transmissions: in the
language of Giechaskiel et al. [44], Selvaraj et al. performed
an existential injection which disturbs the ADC readings, but
not a selective injection of attacker-chosen waveforms, unlike
the earlier work of Foo Kune et al. [5].
As a final point of note, researchers have identified that
coupling into the wiring interconnects within ICs is possi-
ble [74]. However, this disturbance “can be neglected up to
several gigahertz”, since ICs are “usually smaller than a few
centimeters” [74]. This leads to another research question:
Open Question 3: Is it possible to conduct out-of-
band signal injection attacks into digital ICs which
integrate sensors, ADCs, and microcontrollers?
Although this question has been answered in the affirmative
for acoustic attacks (Section VI), it remains open for electro-
magnetic ones.
V. CONDUCTED SIGNALS
A different class of out-of-band signal injection attacks
requires an indirect physical connection between the attacker
and the victim, such as a shared power line. Unlike their
radiated counterparts of Section IV, these conducted attacks do
not require signals to be picked up by unintentional receiving
antennas in the path between sensors and microcontrollers.
Instead, signals are propagated along conductors primarily on
the powering circuit, which can transfer through crosstalk or
coupling to paths containing non-linearities. This propagation
of electrical disturbances through structures and cables is
studied in Transmission-Line Theory [106]–[108], and through
the Baum-Liu-Tesche (BLT) equation [109]–[111].
Much like electromagnetic attacks, out-of-band conducted
signal injection attacks have also been primarily experimental
in nature. Their methodology often follows that of suscepti-
bility literature, which predicts a device’s response to high-
frequency radio signals. Systems tested include microcon-
trollers, ADCs, and other embedded devices which contain
I/O and power pins. The goal of such research is to quantify
immunity to radiated and conducted EM disturbances, and is
typically concerned with the average power received by the
embedded system, similar to the work by Selvaraj et al. [7]
summarized in Section IV.
To avoid legal and practical considerations related to electro-
magnetic transmissions, the experimental approach followed
is known as Direct Power Injection (DPI), and consists of
injecting harmonic disturbances from a few kHz to a couple
of GHz and measuring the relationship between forward
power and frequency. Multiple works have shown that as
the frequency of the input increases, immunity to DPI also
increases [58], [61]–[63], [65], [112].1 In other words, higher
frequencies generally require higher forward power injections
for the same level of susceptibility. This was also true of the
(remote) injections by Selvaraj et al. [7], discussed above.
A similar methodology can be applied to evaluate the
demodulation characteristics of amplifiers and transistors [56],
[57], [60], [66], and therefore better predict the fidelity with
which attackers can inject target waveforms, both in the
conducted and in the radiated settings. This was recently done
by Giechaskiel et al. [44] for six ADCs, with a view on how to
exploit the demodulating effect for out-of-band signal injection
attacks. It was shown that ADCs of three different types
from four manufactures, and with different resolutions and
sampling frequencies can all demodulate AM waveforms [44].
Generally, it was determined that the fundamental frequency
persists along with its harmonics and some high-frequency
components, even for carriers which are multiple times the
ADCs’ sampling and cutoff frequencies [44].
It is worth noting, however, that the different ADCs do
not behave identically. For instance, some ADCs require fine-
tuning of the carrier frequency, with 100Hz making a differ-
ence as to whether the injected signal is fully demodulated
or not [44]. On the other hand, some ADCs are vulnerable
across the spectrum, i.e., for all frequencies which do not get
severely attenuated to filtering effects [44]. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in an extended version of the same paper [116], some
ADCs “result in more sawtooth-like output”, and are therefore
“more resilient to clean sinusoidal injections”. Finally, the
same extended version demonstrates that attacks can also
be performed remotely, without following DPI methodology:
a 10dBm (10mW) transmission can be demodulated by a
receiver amplifier at small distances (5cm).
In their “Trick or Heat” work, Tu et al. [104] also conducted
DPI experiments on operation amplifiers, but with a view on
how to exploit rectification effects for out-of-band signal injec-
tion attacks on temperature sensors. They, too, determined that
as the frequency increases, the magnitude of the AC voltage
decreases, while “EMI signals at specific frequencies induce a
significant DC offset” [104]. Moreover, for a given frequency
of injection, power and the induced DC offset are “locally
proportional”, though the rate of change “gradually decreases
as the power of injected EMI signals grows” [104]. However,
power and DC offset are not always positively correlated, even
for remote transmissions: for some frequencies, the induced
DC offset is negative [104].
Having characterized the behavior of individual amplifiers,
Tu et al. turned their attention to different types of thermal
sensors, including Negative Temperature Coefficient (NTC)
thermistors, shielded and unshielded K-type thermocouples,
and Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs). With a 35dBm
(3.2W) electromagnetic source, Tu et al. succeeded in chang-
ing the reported temperature of various devices by at least
0.5 ◦C [104]. The systems attacked included, among others,
newborn incubators, soldering irons, and 3D printers, which
were placed at distances of up to 6m.
1Immunity behavior is different for EMI-induced offsets through the ground
plane for amplifiers [113] and precision voltage references [114]. See the
survey by Ramdani et al. [115] for more information on RF immunity models.
8In some experiments, a thick wall was present between
the transmitting device and an infant incubator under attack.
It was shown that, even in this setup, an adversary can
increase the measured skin temperature by 3.4 ◦C or decrease
it by 4.5 ◦C [104], again demonstrating the potentially fatal
consequences of out-of-band attacks. Most of the attacks by
Tu et al. used unmodulated transmissions, and therefore only
looked at the relationship between frequency and DC offset,
or the relationship between power and DC offset. However,
when investigated jointly, amplitude modulation was capable
of causing selective injections [44]. In other words, Tu et
al. [104] spelled “HI” in the output of the temperature sensor
by appropriately modulating the amplitude of the transmission.
In a different strand of research, Lopes Esteves and Kasmi
demonstrated how to inject voice commands (“OK Google”)
into a smartphone through conducted means [40]. Specifically,
the attack exploited the fact that on the device’s circuit board,
the phone’s USB charging port is physically close to the audio
frontend, where demodulation (envelope detection) can take
place due to non-linearities [40]. As a result, back-door cou-
pling occurs, either due to “a re-radiation of the interference
from the USB circuitry bypassing the physical isolation by
parasitic coupling (crosstalk) or the possible sharing of the
Vcc and GND networks on the PCB” [40].
Open Question 4: What properties of the power
circuit and related layout considerations make systems
vulnerable to conducted out-of-band signal injections?
The methodology used was inspired by experiments on the
propagation of conducted disturbances and on EM injections
into power cables. Specifically, amplitude-modulated signals
were injected at various locations of the power network, i.e.,
at different plug points on the same strip and on extension
cords. The phone was left charging either on a computer USB
port, or through a wall adapter. Experiments were repeated
both with a magnetic injection probe (directly coupling to
cables), and a “custom coupler made with capacitors, resistors
and a high-frequency transformer” [40]. In all cases, it was
determined that the smartphone can demodulate (and execute)
commands carried on the 200− 250MHz range at distances
up to 10m, even with only a 0.5W source. Such conducted
attacks therefore significantly lower the power requirements
and increase the injection distance compared to the same
authors’ remote EM attack on smartphones [38].
True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) which are
based on Ring Oscillators (ROs) are also vulnerable to con-
ducted signal injection attacks. ROs are composed of an odd
number of logical NOT gates chained together in a ring
formation, where the output of the last gate is used as the
input to the first gate. The value between any two stages of the
RO oscillates between true and false, thus forming a bi-stable
loop. The frequency of oscillation is influenced by the delay of
the logic gates and the delay between the RO’s stages, which
are in turn influenced by small variations in the manufacturing
process, as well as voltage, and temperature (PVT) [117].
As a result, by XORing several ring oscillators together,
one can exploit the randomness of the phase jitter to create
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Fig. 4: Example waveforms for two Ring Oscillators (ROs)
with frequency locking (a) absent or (b) present.
a TRNG [118]. However, due to the frequency dependence
on voltage, a suitable signal can lead to frequency locking of
the oscillators [119], [120], removing the differences in the
randomness of the jitter. Markettos and Moore first conducted
the attack in practice in 2009 by directly injecting 24MHz
signals into the power supply of two ring oscillators composed
of discrete logic chips [35]. Moreover, they succeeded in bias-
ing TRNGs even in secure microcontrollers and smartcards: a
sinusoidal wave of 1V peak-to-peak (2.5mW) at 24.04MHz
was enough to cause a 5V EMV Chip and Pin smartcard to
fail statistical tests of randomness [35].
Time-varying signals are not always necessary: a constant
(DC) power supply voltage can also lead to locking of ring
oscillators in an under-volted Field-Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA). This is because there is a “dependence of the fre-
quency of one oscillator on the current peaks caused by rising
and falling edges of the second oscillator” [121]. Figure 4
illustrates what happens when two ring oscillators frequencies
lock: during normal operation (Figure 4a), the ring oscillator
values “slide past each other, minimising the likelihood of two
rings transitioning together” [35]. However, when a frequency-
or voltage-based attack causes the ROs to lock (Figure 4b),
their relationship becomes predictable, biasing the TRNG.
It should be noted that although under-/over-power attacks
are usually considered fault attacks, in this case the ring
oscillators are still functioning properly, but the entropy of
the TRNG is reduced due to less jitter present [39], [122].
An interesting new class of such remote under-voltage attacks
on TRNGs has recently surfaced. Because ring oscillators
have the potential to increase the delay of FPGA elements by
causing voltage drops, they can also cause timing violations,
thereby reducing the randomness of TRNGs [123]. Such an
attack does not require equipment for physical injections.
Instead, the adversary only needs co-located (but logically and
physically isolated) circuits on the same FPGA as the target
TRNG. This setup reflects multi-tenant cloud designs [123],
and presents new challenges for the protection of shared
FPGAs against software-only attacks without physical access.
Although the above attacks generally alter the power supply
directly, the same outcome can be achieved through EM
emanations targeting the wires connecting the various stages of
the ring oscillators [36], [37], [49]. This requires micro-probes
at very close proximity to the ring oscillators (in the order
of 100µm from the FPGA packaging), so as to localize the
effects of the injection [36], [49]. However, TRNGs are also
vulnerable against EM injections into power supply cables:
9Fig. 5: True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) based on
Ring Oscillators (ROs) are vulnerable to frequency locking:
electromagnetic and conducted signals into power supply
cables can bias the randomness outputs. Are attacks through
a shared mains power supply network also possible?
Osuka et al. demonstrated that an injection probe wrapped
around the DC power supply cable of a TRNG can also
bias the TRNG [42]. Although the design only used two ring
oscillators composed of discrete logic chips,2 injections were
successful even when the probe was placed at a distance of
40cm from the ROs, with a power of only 25.2dBm (0.33W).
It is worth highlighting that although the conducted voice
command injection attack by Lopes Esteves and Kasmi was
performed over shared power lines [40], all existing attacks on
TRNGs bypass AC-to-DC rectification and voltage regulation.
This leads to the following question for future research:
Open Question 5: Is it possible to bias True Random
Number Generators through conducted out-of-band
signal injection attacks on the primary side of power
supplies (mains voltage), as shown in Figure 5?
VI. ACOUSTIC EMANATIONS
Research into out-of-band acoustic signal injection attacks
has primarily focused on: (a) attacking electro-mechanical
devices by causing vibrations at their resonant frequencies; and
(b) exploiting microphone non-linearities for inaudible voice
commands. In the former category, Micro-Electro-Mechanical
Systems (MEMS) gyroscopes and accelerometers have been a
popular target for acoustic resonance attacks.
MEMS gyroscopes operate through “vibrating mechanical
elements to sense rotation” [124]. In other words, MEMS
gyroscopes contain oscillating structures which, when rotated,
appear to have a measurable force (called the Coriolis force)
exerted on them [125]. These mechanical resonators “generate
and maintain a constant linear or angular momentum”, so
that “when the gyroscope is subjected to an angular rotation,
a sinusoidal Coriolis force at the frequency of drive-mode
oscillation is induced in the sense direction” [125]. This force
is exerted in a different direction from the moving direction,
and, depending on the type of the gyroscope, the angular
rotation can be estimated through changes in capacitance,
piezoresistive effects, etc. [124], [125]. Out-of-band acoustic
signal injections transmit sounds at the resonant frequencies
of MEMS sensors, causing them to report incorrect values.
Early research into the properties of MEMS gyroscopes had
shown that high-power acoustic noise at or near the resonant
2 Much like the original work by Markettos and Moore [35]. However,
Bayon et al. [36], [49] targeted a more realistic TRNG composed of 50 ROs.
frequency can degrade the performance of the sensor [126]–
[128]. However, the security effects of intentional sound trans-
missions were not explored until the 2015 “Rocking Drones”
paper by Son et al. [10]. Initially, the effect was a simple
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on drones. It was caused by
the transmission of single-tone sound waves at the resonant
frequency of drones’ gyroscopes, so there was no control over
their movements. The distance was also short, at 10cm using
a speaker producing a Sound Pressure Level (SPL) of up to
113dB at the target frequencies.
Proof-of-concept control was then first demonstrated in
a Black Hat conference presentation against gyroscopes in
virtual reality (VR) headsets and self-balancing vehicles [34].
Tu et al.’s “Injected and Delivered” paper later became the
first academic work to control gyroscopes in a much more
fine-grained fashion [43]. This research allowed control for
long periods of time (up to the minute range), and at long
distances (up to 7.8m with a maximum SPL of 135dB) [43].
Tu et al. noticed that single-tone frequencies (like the ones
used by Son et al. [10]) result in an oscillating discrete (dig-
itized) output, which destabilizes equipment. In other words,
a simple transmission at the resonant frequency is a type of
DoS attack because the angular velocity (as measured by the
gyroscope) fluctuates between positive and negative values
(Figure 6a). However, it is possible to remove these negative
components by decreasing the transmission amplitude during
the corresponding measurements. This is called a Side-Swing
attack, which “proportionally [amplifies] the induced output in
the target direction and attenuate[s] the output in the opposite
direction” [43] (Figure 6b).
Instead of attenuating signals during half of the transmission
period, one can also control “the induced output by manipulat-
ing the phase of the digital signal with repetitive phase pacing”
in a Switching attack [43] (Figure 6c). As this is accomplished
in practice by changing the tonal frequency instead of at-
tenuating the amplitude, a Switching attack contributes twice
as much to the overall change in direction as a Side-Swing
attack. This is shown by looking at the accumulating heading
angle in Figure 7. It should be noted that by accounting for
drifts in the sampling rate of the ADC (which are amplified
during adversarial injections [43]), both attacks can control the
gyroscopic output for longer periods of time.
In response to the rising interest in acoustic vulnerabilities,
Khazaaleh et al. [129] created a mathematical model to explain
the resonance response of gyroscopes. They showed that “the
misalignment between the sensing and driving axes of the
gyroscope is the main culprit behind the vulnerability of
the gyroscope to ultrasonic attacks” [129]. More precisely,
because “the sensing direction is not exactly orthogonal to
the driving direction, some of the energy gets coupled to the
sensing direction” [129]. This causes a false reading, which
is typically corrected “by employing a demodulator in the
readout circuit” [129]. When the transmission frequency is
slightly different from the sensing frequency, the gyroscope
generates “measurable output”, whose frequency equals “the
difference between the driving frequency and the frequency
of the acoustic signal” [129]. As shown experimentally, this
model also explains why it is better to transmit near the reso-
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Fig. 6: Different acoustic injection approaches against gyroscopes. For (a) a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, a single-tone
transmission at the gyroscope’s resonant frequency suffices. This results in oscillating digital measurements of angular velocity,
and can destabilize equipment [10], [43]. To remove the negative measurement components, one can either (b) decrease the
transmission amplitude in a Side-Swing attack [43], or (c) change the frequency of transmission for a Switching attack [43].
The cumulative effects of these approaches are shown in Figure 7.
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Fig. 7: Effects of the three attacks of Figure 6. In a Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack, the accumulating heading angle fluc-
tuates, while it continues increasing for both attacks proposed
by Tu et al. [43]. In Switching attacks, the angle increases at
twice the rate of Side-Swing attacks.
nant frequency rather than exactly at it [129]. It also suggests
that low-pass filters or differential measurements through ad-
ditional proof masses are ineffective countermeasures against
out-of-band acoustic signal injection attacks [129].
Although Tu et al. succeeded in controlling gyroscopes in
phones, scooters, stabilizers, screwdrivers, and VR headsets
among others, only DoS attacks were successful against ac-
celerometers [43]. MEMS accelerometers consist of spring-
mass systems, so acceleration results in a deflection of the seis-
mic mass. This deflection “is detected by means of capacitive
elements, the capacitances of which change with deflection,
or by piezoresistive elements that detect strain induced by
the motion of the seismic mass through a change in resistor
values” [130]. Acoustic vibrations at the resonant frequencies
of the spring-mass systems can also displace the suspended
mass, making them vulnerable to out-of-band attacks. Ac-
cording to Trippel et al., insecure amplifiers and low-pass
filters (LPFs) prior to the accelerometer ADCs can demodulate
both Amplitude-Modulated (AM) and Phase-Modulated (φM)
attacker injections [13]. These insecurities are the results of
clipping non-linearities and permissive filtering respectively,
and allow for both biasing and control attacks.
Trippel et al. used accelerometers to spell words, naming
their work “WALNUT” for the output of the spoofed sensor
measurements. They were also able to control off-the-shelf
devices, such as remote-controlled (RC) cars, and Fitbit fitness
tracking wristbands [13]. Although spoofing step counts might
seem innocuous, companies often offer financial rewards for
health-related activity [13], so cheating devices (which do not
yet exploit out-of-band effects) are already being sold [131].
Most attacks by Trippel et al. [13] were performed at distances
of 10cm, with a speaker producing an SPL of 110dB. The
duration of control over the output of the MEMS sensors
was often limited to 1− 2s (and up to 30s) due to sampling
rate drifts. Moreover, it was shown that the three axes do not
behave identically to acoustic injections. For example, there
are some MEMS devices for which only the x-axis responds
to acoustic transmissions, while others are vulnerable in all
three axes, but at different resonant frequencies.
Although Trippel et al. [13] attacked a single sensor in one
direction at a time, Nashimoto et al.’s “Sensor CON-Fusion”
investigated whether sensor fusion using a Kalman Filter can
improve the robustness of measurements [41]. It was shown
that “while sensor fusion introduces a certain degree of attack
resilience, it remains susceptible” to combined acoustic and
electromagnetic injections [41]. Specifically, Nashimoto suc-
ceeded in simultaneously controlling the roll, pitch, and yaw
(the three angular axes in aircraft nomenclature) by fusing the
outputs of an accelerometer, a gyroscope, and magnetometer.
However, in non-simulated environments, “there is an error
in the roll angle”, and “the resulting inclination does not last
long” [41]. Although fusion is further explored in the context
of defense mechanisms (Section IX), the above discussion
leads to the following research question:
Open Question 6: Is it possible to use acoustic
injections to precisely control MEMS gyroscope and
accelerometer measurements in all three directions
simultaneously and/or for longer periods of time?
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Fig. 8: High-level overview of ultrasonic attacks against
microphones [11], [55], [133], [134]. A speaker transmits
inaudible tones, but intermodulation products are produced due
to non-linearities in the microphone and amplifier. A Low-Pass
Filter (LPF) removes ultrasound frequencies, so the Analog-
to-Digital Converter (ADC) records only audible by-products.
In a different strand of research, ten years after a video
demonstrating that shouting in a data center causes unusually
high disk I/O latency [132], Shahrad et al. showed that acous-
tic transmissions can cause vibrations in Hard-Disk Drives
(HDDs) [53]. These vibrations result in read and write errors
at distances up to 70cm with a sound level of 102.6dBA [53].
As a result, they can make systems unresponsive, even leading
to Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) errors [53].
Although Shahrad et al. primarily focused on the effect of
the angle of transmission [53], research conducted in parallel
more precisely pinpointed the root cause of the issue using
Finite Element Analysis [12]. Specifically, it was shown that
(audible) acoustic waves “can displace a read/write head or
disk platter outside of operational bounds, inducing throughput
loss”, even though the displacement is of only a few nanome-
ters [12]. In addition, in their “Blue Note” paper, Bolton et al.
also used ultrasonic transmissions to attack the shock sensors
which are meant to protect HDDs during sudden drops by
“parking the read/write head” [12]: modern HDDs contain
“piezo shock sensors or MEMS capacitive accelerometers” to
“detect sudden disturbances” [12], and can also be attacked
through ultrasound transmissions at their resonant frequencies.
Through these malicious acoustic attacks, SPL levels of up
to 130dB cause HDDs at distances of 10cm to become
unresponsive, thus disabling laptops and video recorders [12].
Not all acoustic attacks transmit at resonant frequencies. By
contrast, other research targets microphone non-linearities to
cause inaudible sound to be recorded. Microphones operate by
converting the mechanical deformation of a membrane (caused
by the air pressure of a sound wave) into a capacitive change,
which produces an Alternating Current (AC) signal [11]. This
process also has non-linearities which produce second-order
components [11], including harmonics and intermodulation
products, as discussed in Section III.
Early work on acoustic attacks primarily focused on ad-
versarial control of machine learning in speech recognition
systems [135], [136]. Such research did not take advantage
of non-linearities, and was in-band, as the transmissions were
audible (although indecipherable by humans). However, later
investigations revolved around ensuring that the transmitted
frequencies are beyond the human-audible range (20kHz).
This was first accomplished by Zhang et al. in their “Dolphi-
nAttack” paper, which exploited non-linearities in microphone
sensors [11], as shown in Figure 8.
The work by Zhang et al. showed how to transform (mod-
ulated) ultrasound transmissions into valid commands which
were executed by speech recognition systems such as Apple
Siri, Google Now, Microsoft Cortana, and Amazon Alexa [11].
The same authors later expanded on their attack by testing
different setups, and increasing the attack distance from 1.7m
to 19.8m [134]. This was done by replacing the 125dB source
with an ultrasonic transmitter array and amplifier outputting
1.5W to increase sound pressure. Above this transmission
power, the attack becomes audible due to non-linearities in
the transmission medium (air) and the source speakers [11].
Earlier, Roy et al. had also noted that non-linearities in
speakers make it harder for an adversary to increase the
attack distance: “increasing the transmit power at the speaker
triggers non-linearities at the speaker’s own diaphragm and
amplifier, resulting in an audible [output]” [55]. Instead,
multiple speakers in the form of an ultrasonic speaker array
can be used to attack voice recognition systems including
Amazon Alexa and Google Now at a distance of up to 7.6m
using a 6W source [55]. The attack works by partitioning
the audio spectrum across the various speakers in a way
that “reduces the audible leakage from any given speaker”
while minimizing the total leakage power [55]. This prevents
any of the non-linearities (and the transmitted signal itself)
from being audible. It should be noted that if multiple non-
cooperating ultrasonic sources are emitting simultaneously,
intermodulation distortions can create audible byproducts [68],
allowing for the detection of potential attacks.
Parallel to the 2017 DolphinAttack paper [11], similar
research was in progress at Princeton [133]: Song and Mittal
also succeeded in injecting inaudible voice commands to an
Amazon Echo and an Android phone. Although they accom-
plished relatively long distances (3.54m with an input power
of 23.7W), their work remains in poster format. Moreover,
prior to their inaudible voice commands work [55], Roy et al.
also used inaudible ultrasound transmissions to record audible
sounds. Specifically, in their “BackDoor” work, they proposed
a high-bandwidth covert channel that operates at up to 1.5m
using a 2W source [54]. Although covert channels are not
discussed in this survey, the work by Roy et al. is included
due to the methodology which naturally led to their later work.
More concretely, instead of using amplitude modulation
over a single frequency like Zhang et al. [11], Roy et al.
simultaneously played two ultrasound tones whose shadows
create audible sounds (only sensed by microphones) due to
non-linearities [54]. They showed that amplitude modulation
could not be used due to non-linearities in the ultrasound
transmitters themselves, which would result in audible sig-
nals. Instead, further pre-computation was required to remove
the “ringing effect”, where “the transmitted sound becomes
slightly audible even with FM modulation” [54]. These results
point towards the next open question [134]:
Open Question 7: How can non-linear acoustics in
the transmission medium (air and speakers) be avoided
to further extend the range of inaudible attacks?
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VII. OPTICAL AND THERMAL MANIPULATIONS
Although electromagnetic, conducted, and acoustic attacks
form the majority of out-of-band signal injection attacks,
there has been some research on optical attacks, as well
as temperature attacks which bias RO-based TRNGs. In the
former category, attacks exploit permissive filtering and poor
shielding in interfaces which only expect ambient environ-
mental conditions. Most papers so far have targeted sensors
in an in-band fashion: out-of-scope research includes attacks
on sonars, radars, and LiDARs [9], [14], [31], [32], as well as
visible-light attacks on cameras in unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) [52] and cars [9], [14], [32].
Researchers have also hypothesized that excessive light
injections would blind car cameras and confuse auto-controls
in automated vehicles [137]. Indeed, limited success against
cameras has been achieved using Ultraviolet (UV) and Infrared
(IR) lasers up to 2m away [14]. However, attacks were
only possible in dark environments, and the results were not
reproducible with invisible lasers against other makes and
models of CMOS cameras [9].
In a different strand of research, Park et al. showed that
some medical infusion pumps are not well-protected against
adversarial optical injections [8]. Specifically, in order to
measure the flow rate of the medicine being administered,
pumps are fitted with drip measurement sensors. These sensors
consist of an IR emitter and receiver facing each other. When
a drop passes through the sensor, the IR receiver temporarily
senses less light due to diffusion, allowing for the rate to be
measured. However, because the sensor is not well-enclosed,
an adversary can shine an IR laser into the sensor, causing
these drops to be undetected, thereby saturating the sensor.
By then un-blinding the sensor, the attackers can also trick
the firmware into detecting fake drops, and bypass alarms.
Adversaries can therefore selectively both over- and under-
infuse a patient for an extended period of time, and for a
variety of normal flow volumes. However, this can only be
done with coarse-grained control over the real flow rate. Most
of the experiments by Park et al. were conducted at a distance
of 10cm. Success was nevertheless reported up to 12m away
using a 30mW IR laser pointer [8]. These results show that
optical attacks can reach meaningful distances, but are, of
course, limited by line-of-sight considerations.
It should be noted that the attack by Park et al. should be
considered to be out-of-band, as the pump was not meant to
receive external stimuli, in contrast to, for example, LiDARs,
which are supposed to interact with external objects. In other
words, a LiDAR depends on its surroundings to reflect its
transmitted pulses and therefore infer the distance to the
interfering objects. On the other hand, the drip sensor and
(part of) the intravenous (IV) tube could be enclosed and
shielded from the environment. This naturally leads to the
defense mechanisms proposed by Park et al. [8], which are
discussed in Section IX, and which beg the following question:
Open Question 8: Are all out-of-band optical attacks
a matter of poor filtering and shielding?
Fig. 9: Unconventional circuit layout to convert a Light
Emitting Diode (LED) into a photodiode [138]. Pull-up and
-down resistors can be internal to microcontroller input pins.
Under somewhat unrealistic assumptions, the answer to
the above question might be “no”. In their typical mode of
operation, Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) convert current to
light. However, they can also function in the reverse by pro-
ducing current when illuminated [139], [140]. In preliminary
experiments, Loughry recently showed that this behavior can
be exploited for an optical covert channel [138]. The setup
is certainly unconventional: both LED pins are connected to
microcontroller GPIO pins, which are configured as inputs
with (internal) pull-up and pull-down resistors, as shown in
Figure 9. According to Loughry, seven out of ten LEDs tested
responded to laser and light of different wavelengths, with
some LEDs producing measurable current at both ends (anode
and cathode) [138]. Whether out-of-band signal injections or
fault attacks can exploit this effect is yet to be seen [138].
The final class of attacks exploits the dependence of ring
oscillators (ROs) on temperature to reduce the entropy of the
TRNG. It is only mentioned here for completeness, as distance
requirements would dictate physical access to the device under
attack. Early work in the area showed that statistical random-
ness tests of RO-based TRNGs would fail for certain FPGA
temperatures [141]. More detailed experimentation conducted
a few years later using different heat-transfer methods (resistor
heater, Peltier cooler, and liquid nitrogen) then showed that
“the hotter the temperature, the larger the bias” [142]. Martín
et al. [39] also investigated the effect of temperature across
multiple TNRG designs based on Self-Timed Rings (STRs),
which do not exhibit the frequency locking effects discussed
earlier [143]. It was shown that the effects of temperature
increases on the randomness of STR-based TRNGs were not
significant, due to a combination of a decrease in frequency
and an increase in jitter due to thermal noise [39].
Since devices were operating within their specifications,
these biasing effects could be considered out-of-band attacks
which operate at limited distances. This is in contrast to, for
example, Martín et al.’s work which investigates the entropy
of TRNGs in response to ionizing radiation [144]. However,
remote conducted attacks on TRNGs are possible using local
voltage drops [123]. Whether it is possible to reproduce these
effects using heating circuits [145] remains an open question:
Open Question 9: Can software-only thermal effects
bias RO-based TRNGs in multi-tenant FPGAs?
Overall, the efficacy of out-of-band optical thermal injec-
tions has been limited so far, due to the limited nature of vul-
nerable interfaces and proximity considerations respectively.
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VIII. TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS
This section presents a taxonomy of out-of-band signal
injection attacks, tracing their evolution through time and
topic, and identifying commonalities in their methodology and
source of vulnerability. We first highlight thematic and evolu-
tionary cross-influences between the various works studied in
this survey (Figure 10), and then categorize the key hardware
imperfections that make them possible (Table II). We start
with a citation graph of out-of-band attacks and related work
in Figure 10, where an edge X → Y indicates that X is cited
by Y . To reduce clutter, if a paper X is cited by both Y and
Z , and Y is cited by Z , then no arrow from X to Y is drawn.
Figure 10 reveals that cross-influences are not limited to
attacks. Instead, there is a general trend of earlier research
observing the effects of non-adversarial interference, with later
work actively exploiting the same phenomenon for signal
injection attacks. For example, multiple works had identi-
fied the effects of electromagnetic interference on medical
devices [82], [83], [89], [90] (with more papers discussed
in Section IV), but Foo Kune et al. [5] were the first to
recognize the effect as a security concern rather than a safety
and reliability one. Similarly, Dean et al. commented on the
effect of acoustic noise on gyroscopes [127], [128], but Son
et al. [10] later used the same effect to destabilize drones.
Observation 1: Out-of-band signal injection attacks
identify the effect of noise on systems and find novel
ways to amplify it through hardware imperfections.
The graph further shows that out-of-band signal injection
attack topics and methodology has both been inspired by
and has itself inspired research exploiting more traditional
avenues of attack. For example, investigations into acoustic
signal injection attacks [11], [54], [55] have been influenced
by research exploiting machine learning algorithms which
respond to commands which are audible but indecipherable by
humans [135], [136]. In addition, out-of-band acoustic attacks
on MEMS sensors [10], [13] have both inspired and been influ-
enced by in-band optical attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) [52]. Moreover, after the effects of acoustic noise on
the security of gyroscopes were first identified [10], subsequent
work improved the level of control over the output [43], and
attacked additional types of MEMS sensors [13], and electro-
mechanical devices such as HDDs [12].
Observation 2: After an exploitable hardware im-
perfection has been identified, determining its root
cause opens up new avenues of attacks across different
domains, and with alternative methodologies.
Figure 10 further highlights a few key works which in
the opinion of the authors have played a central role in the
development of the field. The first set of such papers [5], [10],
[11], [35], [36] was chosen due to the high number of citations
they have received overall (≥ 95) and from other out-of-band
attack research (≥ 5).3 Specifically, the works by Markettos
3Citation counts are current as of 8 Nov. 2019 according to Google Scholar.
and Moore [35] and by Bayon et al. [36] were chosen because
they successfully biased TRNGs in the conducted and EM
settings respectively, going beyond earlier theoretical work
on oscillator locking [119], [147]. Their work led to the
development of a new branch of attacks, which has so far
developed rather independently of other out-of-band signal
injections, as shown in Figure 10.
Foo Kune et al.’s work on adversarial electromagnetic
interference [5] also features prominently in Figure 10, having
been cited by almost all out-of-band signal injection attacks
that were published after it (with the exception of TRNG
research). Foo Kune et al. were the first to successfully exploit
non-linearities and unintentional antennas in remote electro-
magnetic injection attacks, which were non-adversarial in prior
work (e.g., [82], [83]) or only mentioned in passing [33].
With over 160 citations since 2017, the research by Zhang
et al. [11] has been very influential in the realm of out-of-
band acoustic attacks against microphones. Unlike earlier work
on covert communication [54], and indecipherable-yet-audible
commands [135], [136], Zhang et al.’s “DolphinAttack” ex-
ploited microphone non-linearities for inaudible injections.
Research on acoustic attacks is perhaps more mature against
MEMS sensors, in great part due to early work by Son et al.,
who first showed how to disrupt gyroscopes [10]. Moreover,
Trippel et al.’s research has also significantly furthered the
state-of-the-art in acoustic injections by controlling the output
of accelerometers for short periods of time [13]. As a result,
the work of Tu et al., which showed how to extend the duration
of control [43], is in the second set of works highlighted in
Figure 10. This set contains recent studies whose novelty and
potential has not yet received mainstream attention.4 For ex-
ample, the techniques proposed by Tu et al. to overcome ADC
sampling rate drifts should be applicable to other methods of
injection, and against different types of targets. We place the
work by Bolton et al. [12] in the same category, as it managed
to bridge research on HDD attacks (e.g., [53]) with attacks on
MEMS sensors, and contained significant insights into why
resonance attacks against hard drives work.
The final work highlighted in Figure 10 is the in-band
attack of Shoukry et al. against an Anti-lock Braking System
(ABS) [6]. It has been included not just for its high citation
count (> 135, of which 10 are out-of-band attacks), but
because it is the first EM paper to focus on the magnetic field
rather than the electric field. As a result, it serves as inspiration
to recent out-of-band magnetic attacks [7], [41], which we
hope will be explored more in the future (Section XI).
We also summarize the various out-of-band signal injection
attacks along with factors which contribute to them in Table II.
The table further notes the maximum power used and distance
achieved for an attack, including the level of control over the
resulting signal. Effects range from theoretical attacks which
are only partially realized to practical attacks which disrupt,
bias, or completely control the output. As Table II indicates,
information on the attack setup was often hard to find, some-
times completely missing, and often had to be identified by
4Trippel et al’s 2017 work [13] lies between the two categories, already
having over 75 citations, 12 of which are from other attack papers.
15
TABLE II: Sources of vulnerability, methods, and effects for out-of-band signal injection attacks along with maximum power
and distance. For each potential source of vulnerability,  signifies that the paper claims the vulnerability contributes to the
attack, while – that it does not. The attack methods used are n acoustic,  conducted,O electromagnetic, anda optical. The
effects achieved include disruption, bias, and control of the output, while denotes a theoretical or partially-realized
attack. Resonance (†) includes frequency locking for ring oscillators, and unintentional wire antennas for EM attacks.
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Rasmussen et al. 2009 [33] Medical (unspecified) (unspecified) O  – –  –
Petit et al. 2015 [14] Camera (unspecified) 2.00m a – –  – –
Cao et al. 2016 [122] TRNG (under-volt) (direct)   – – – –
Wang et al. 2017 [34] MEMS (unspecified) (unspecified) n     –
Nashimoto et al. 2018 [41] MEMS (unspecified) (unspecified) nO  –   
Mahmoud and Stoilovic´ 2019 [123] TRNG (140K ROs) (internal)   – – – –
Markettos and Moore 2009 [35] TRNG 0.002W (direct)   –  – 
Bayon et al. 2012 [36] TRNG 0.003W 100µm O  – – – –
Buchovecka et al. 2013 [37] TRNG ≤ 0.563W “near” O  – – – –
Kune et al. 2013 [5] Med. & Mic. 10.000W 1.67m O     –
Kasmi and Lopes Esteves 2015 [38] Microphone 200.000W 4.00m O  – –  
Bayon et al. 2016 [49] TRNG 0.003W 100µm O  – – – –
Park et al. 2016 [8] Medical 0.030W 12.00m a – – –  
Roy et al. 2017 [54] Microphone 2.000W 1.50m n –  – – –
Song and Mittal 2017 [133] Microphone 23.700W 3.54m n –  – – –
Lopes Esteves and Kasmi 2018 [40] Microphone 0.500W 10.00m     – 
Osuka et al. 2018 [42] TRNG 0.331W 0.40m O  – – – –
Roy et al. 2018 [55] Microphone 6.000W 7.62m n –  – – 
Selvaraj et al. 2018 [7] GPIO 1.820W 1.00m O     –
Giechaskiel et al. 2019 [44] ADC 0.010W 0.05m O     
Tu et al. 2019 [104] Temp. & Amp. 3.162W 6.00m O     –
Yan et al. 2019 [134] Microphone 1.500W 19.80m n –  – – 
Son et al. 2015 [10] MEMS 113dB 0.10m n  – –  –
Trippel et al. 2017 [13] MEMS 110dB 0.10m n     
Zhang et al. 2017 [11] Microphone 125dB 1.75m n –  – – 
Bolton et al. 2018 [12] HDD 130dB 0.10m n  – –  
Shahrad et al. 2018 [53] HDD 103dBA 0.70m n  – –  –
Tu et al. 2018 [43] MEMS 135dB 7.80m n  –   
Khazaaleh et al. 2019 [129] MEMS 94dB 0.11m n  – –  
looking up the datasheets of the signal generators, antennas,
and amplifiers used. This lack of experimental details is further
discussed in the context of future research in Section XI.
We identify five key aspects of vulnerability that attacks
exploit: resonance; non-linearity; improper filtering; poor
shielding; and insecure algorithms. All attacks which do not
target microphones and optical sensors depend on resonance
of some sort: this can be acoustic resonance of mechanical
structures, electromagnetic resonant frequencies of uninten-
tional antennas, or the existence of locking frequencies for
ring oscillators. Other attacks depend on non-linearities of
amplifiers, microphones, and speakers to demodulate high-
frequency signals. This is because resonant frequencies are
often much higher than those of desired injection waveforms.
In addition, many works identify improper filtering, particu-
larly prior to ADCs and amplifiers, as well as poor shielding as
factors for out-of-band attacks. Finally, in some cases, insecure
sampling and processing algorithms exacerbate the problem
by making it easier for an adversary to trick the system
under attack into performing a dangerous action. These sources
of vulnerability form the basis for many of the proposed
countermeasures, which we discuss in detail in Section IX.
IX. ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES
Although the literature on out-of-band attacks is quite broad,
research on defenses has been more sparse. Section IX-A first
summarizes the state-of-the-art in countermeasures specific
to out-of-band injections. Section IX-B then expands our
discussion by introducing general protective and preventive
approaches which remain applicable in this context.
A. Out-of-Band Defense Mechanisms
The works that have investigated countermeasures against
out-of-band signal injection attacks have noted that a combi-
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TABLE III: Summary of evaluated (), proposed (A), and absent (–) countermeasures against n acoustic,  conducted,
O electromagnetic, anda optical out-of-band signal injection attacks.
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Markettos and Moore 2009 [35] TRNG O A – – A A –
Rasmussen et al. 2009 [33] Medical O – – – – A –
Bayon et al. 2012 [36] TRNG O – – – – – –
Buchovecka et al. 2013 [37] TRNG O – – – – – –
Kune et al. 2013 [5] Medical O  – –   
Kasmi and Lopes Esteves 2015 [38] Microphone O A – – – A A
Petit et al. 2015 [14] Camera a – – A A – –
Shoukry et al. 2015 [69] Active Sensors O –  – – – –
Son et al. 2015 [10] MEMS n A – – –  –
Bayon et al. 2016 [49] TRNG O – – – – – –
Cao et al. 2016 [122] TRNG  – – – – – –
Park et al. 2016 [8] Medical a – – – – A A
Roy et al. 2017 [54] Microphone n – – – – – –
Shin et al. 2016 [48] Medical a – – A – A –
Song and Mittal 2017 [133] Microphone n – – – – – –
Trippel et al. 2017 [13] MEMS n A  – A A –
Wang et al. 2017 [34] MEMS n A – A – A A
Zhang et al. 2017 [11] Microphone n  – – – – 
Bolton et al. 2018 [12] HDD n A – A –  
Lopes Esteves and Kasmi 2018 [40] Microphone  – – – A – A
Nashimoto et al. 2018 [41] MEMS nO – –  – – –
Osuka et al. 2018 [42] TRNG O – – – A A –
Roy et al. 2018 [55] Microphone n – – – – – 
Selvaraj et al. 2018 [7] GPIO O – – – A A –
Shahrad et al. 2018 [53] HDD n A – – – A A
Tu et al. 2018 [43] MEMS n – A A A A –
Giechaskiel et al. 2019 [44] ADC O A A – A A A
Khazaaleh et al. 2019 [129] MEMS n A – – – A A
Mahmoud and Stoilovic´ 2019 [123] TRNG  – – – – – A
Muniraj and Farhood 2019 [148] Servo O –  – – – 
Tu et al. 2019 [104] Temp. & Amp. O – – A A A 
Yan et al. 2019 [134] Microphone n  – – – – 
Tharayil et al. 2019 [149] MEMS nO – –  – – 
Zhang and Rasmussen 2020 [105] Generic Sensors O –  – A A –
nation of prevention and detection techniques both in software
and in hardware are necessary to improve security. We have
divided the proposed defense mechanisms into six categories:
more resilient hardware; improved sampling algorithms; sen-
sor fusion and duplication; better filtering; additional shield-
ing; and anomaly detection of measurements and the en-
vironment. We discuss each category in detail below, and
summarize the various proposals per paper in Table III. As the
table indicates, much of the discussion has been theoretical,
with few works evaluating countermeasures in practice.
Observation 3: The effectiveness of proposed coun-
termeasures remains mostly theoretical, as practical
implementations are often limited in scope, with super-
ficial discussion of monetary and computational costs.
Robust Hardware: In response to resonance and non-linearity
vulnerabilities, various works have proposed preventive im-
provements in the hardware itself to make it more robust and
less susceptible to attacks. One of these improvements against
electromagnetic attacks reduces asymmetries in differential
inputs to a system. By doing so, attacker transmissions are
received almost identically by the two unintentional receiving
antennas, and are severely attenuated. For example, Markettos
and Moore recommend reducing the asymmetries in ring
oscillators through “carefully balanced transistors”, or the
use of differential ones, which are “less affected by supply
and substrate noise” [35]. Similarly, Foo Kune et al. found
that using differential rather than single-ended comparators
attenuated signals by up to 30dB [5]. Although signals could
still be injected, the power requirements to do so increased
significantly, thereby raising the bar for attackers.
Another approach is to change the sensors themselves,
rather than attempt to improve the physical layout of a circuit.
For example, both Shahrad et al. [53] and Bolton et al. [12]
note that replacing Hard-Disk Drives (HDDs) with Solid-State
Drives (SSDs) thwarts acoustic resonance attacks due to a lack
of moving parts. In a similar vein, Zhang et al. noted that
the iPhone 6 Plus resisted their inaudible voice commands,
since it is “designed to suppress any acoustic signals whose
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Fig. 11: High-level overview of the defense mechanism by
Zhang and Rasmussen [105]. Oversampling by a factor of 2n
and selectively turning sensors on and off allows detection
of out-of-band electromagnetic attacks: without knowing the
secret sequence (1001 here for n = 4), the adversary will cause
inconsistent (A) or unexpected (B) non-zero samples.
frequencies are in the ultrasound range” [11].
Finally, better frontends with fewer non-linearities are less
sensitive to EMI noise [38], [44] and sonic injections [11],
[13], [34]. They can therefore make it harder for adversaries
to inject their desired signals into the system. Such general
designs are discussed in greater detail in Section IX-B.
Better Sampling: Many papers have proposed improvements
in the sampling technique to make it harder for an adversary
to predict how a high-frequency signal will be converted to
a low-frequency one. In 2015, Shoukry et al. proposed an
alternative method of sampling active sensors called “PyCRA”
(for Physical Challenge-Response Authentication) to detect
signal injection attacks [69]. Active sensors “perform some
action to evoke and measure a physical response from some
measurable entity”, and include, for instance, magnetic en-
coders measuring angular velocity. Shoukry et al.’s proposal
revolves around physical challenges to prove the absence of
adversarial transmissions. Specifically, when the actuator is
off (silenced), there should be no measured quantity unless an
attack is taking place. By only shutting down the actuator
for a small period of time, PyCRA can detect attackers
without compromising the quality of sensor measurements
and actuation results. Adversaries cannot stop transmissions in
time due to physical and computational delay limits, allowing
PyCRA to identify them [69]. It should be noted that Shin et al.
have suggested that PyCRA would require high computational
overhead in practice, both in terms of the minimum sampling
rate needed to hit those physical limits, and for the detectors
themselves [48]. Moreover, PyCRA requires active sensors, so
it primarily protects against in-band attacks.
However, a similar proposal by Zhang and Rasmussen re-
cently showed how to protect both powered and non-powered
passive sensors [105]. The key idea is to use a secret bitstream
to selectively turn off the sensor and observe whether the
measured signal has been altered by electromagnetic injec-
tions, as shown in Figure 11. More concretely, for each sensor
measurement, 2n ADC samples are taken, corresponding to an
n-bit secret sequence. Each secret bit is Manchester-encoded,
so that a 0-bit is represented as the pair (0,1), corresponding
to turning the sensors off for one sample, and then turning
them on (“biasing”) for another sample. A 1-bit is similarly
encoded as the pair (1,0), first turning on the sensor, and then
turning it off during the second sample.
When the sensor is turned off, all samples should be close
to zero, within some noise- and device-dependent tolerance.
Moreover, for fast-enough sampling frequencies and slow-
enough sensor signals, the n samples when the sensor is
on should be close to each other. As a result, to inject a
single measurement successfully, an attacker needs to correctly
predict the n secret bits, which only happens with probability
2−n for a randomly chosen bit sequence. By using a switch,
non-powered passive sensors can also be adapted to use this
approach. Moreover, spikes in the frequency domain allow
Zhang and Rasmussen to detect attacker transmissions even for
non-constant sensor signals [105]. Overall, by oversampling
for each sensor measurement, noise can be distinguished from
adversarial signals with probabilistic guarantees.
An alternative approach to prevent attackers from injecting
their desired waveforms into a system is to add randomness
to the sampling process, especially for ADCs which are only
vulnerable for limited carrier frequencies [44]. The effect is
essentially one of “having an inaccurate ADC” [13], allowing
a moving average to filter out injected periodic signals. This is
similar to sampling with a “dynamic sample rate”, defeating
the side-swing and switching attacks of Tu et al. [43], which
were explained in Section VI. Out-of-phase sampling has
also been proposed as a band-stop filter to reject frequencies
near an accelerometer’s resonant frequency, thereby removing
attacker-injected DC offsets [13].
It should be noted that protecting against signal injection
attacks into actuators has not been studied as extensively in
literature. However, Muniraj and Farhood recently proposed
a detection method based on a watermarking scheme that
slightly alters the actuation parameters [148], similar to the
proposal of Zhang and Rasmussen [105]. Under attack, the
measured response of the system does not match the effect
of the watermark, allowing detection. The same paper also
suggested pseudo-randomly changing the pulse frequency of
the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signals, making an actu-
ator attack harder to accomplish. Overall, these methods only
alter the shape of the waveform that an adversary can inject
rather than the root cause of the vulnerability itself. They are
therefore not sufficient countermeasures by themselves.
Sensor Fusion: A few works have suggested that using
sensors of different types (fusion) or multiple sensors of the
same type (duplication) with different vulnerable frequency
ranges will make injections harder [12], [14], [34], [43], [48].
This is because an adversary would need to mount multiple
simultaneous attacks, which potentially interfere destructively.
However, in “Sensor CON-Fusion”, Nashimoto et al. [41]
showed that a fusion algorithm based on Kalman filters could
be circumvented (Section VI). As a result, better techniques
are needed to protect against adversarial injections, instead of
simply faulty readings [150], [151]. Tharayil et al. proposed an
improved such fusion algorithm, which takes into account the
mathematical relations between the underlying physical quan-
tities. This allows them to link measurements by a gyroscope
and a magnetometer in a way which can detect adversarial
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injections without any hardware modifications [149].
Other researchers have proposed that additional sensors be
used to measure and counteract attacker signals. These addi-
tional components should not be identical to the vulnerable
sensors: as Khazaaleh et al. show, many MEMS gyroscopes
integrate a second, “identical proof mass to perform differen-
tial measurements” and “eliminate unwanted vibrations” [129].
However, they still remain vulnerable to ultrasonic attacks.
Instead, “an additional gyroscope [...] that responds only to
the resonant frequency” may be able to remove the resonance
effect from the main gyroscope [10]. Similarly, microphones
might be able to detect (and potentially cancel) resonant
frequencies to protect MEMS gyroscopes [34] and HDDs [12].
This approach would be hard in practice, at least for hard
drives: the area to be protected would need to cover “the
read/write head [completely] as it moves across the disk”, and
the sound wave to be generated would be potentially large,
raising many issues about its implementation [12].
Filtering: Most papers studied highlight the need for better
filters to reduce the vulnerable frequency range against con-
ducted [35], [40], [44], [104], electromagnetic [5], [7], [42],
[44], [104], [105], acoustic [13], [43], and optical attacks [14].
However, only Foo Kune et al. [5] have performed systematic
experiments studying the effect of filtering on the efficacy of
out-of-band signal injection attacks. To start with, Foo Kune
et al. noted that adding a low-pass filter in their experiments
against bluetooth headsets allowed audio signals to pass,
but attenuated the injected electromagnetic signal by 40dB.
Moreover, they proposed an adaptive filtering mechanism
which uses the measured signal and the ambient EMI level to
cancel the attacker-injected waveform. Using a Finite Impulse
Response (FIR) filter, the algorithm estimates this waveform,
and allows quick recovery of the original signal, after an onset
period at the beginning of the attack. It should be noted,
however, that filters might not be effective against MEMS
sensors: Khazaaleh et al. noted that “false readings could not
be attenuated by adding a 10Hz low-pass filter”, despite the
resonant frequency being in the kHz range [129].
Shielding: Better separation from the environment also im-
proves protection against out-of-band signal injection attacks.
For this reason, it has been recommended by most authors
investigating attacks on sensors other than microphones. This
shielding may come in the form of physical isolation [8], [10],
[43], [53], [129], better acoustic dampening materials [12],
[13], [34], [43], or radio frequency shielding [5], [7], [33],
[35], [38], [42], [44], [48], [104], [105]. For instance, Foo
Kune et al. demonstrated a 40dB attenuation of the injected
signal, even when the shielding had “large imperfections” [5].
These openings (e.g., for wires to pass through) result in
“major degradations in the shielding” [152]. Indeed, Selvaraj
et al. noted that “while a light sensor can function in a
mesh-based Faraday cage, magnetic shielding would prevent
light from reaching the sensor” [7]. In addition, Bolton et
al. showed that dampening foam “significantly reduced an
HDD’s susceptibility to write blocking”, but “did not attenuate
lower frequency signals” [12]. Moreover, the foam led to an
increased temperature of 10 ◦C, which can also result in disk
failure. As a result, “it is often necessary to use a combination
of shielding and other protective measures” [152].
Anomaly Detection: Instead of trying to prevent signal injec-
tion attacks, some works have proposed better software-level
processing of sensor signals, primarily for anomaly detection,
with or without additional hardware. One such approach is to
estimate the ambient level of electromagnetic [5], [38], [104],
optical [8] and acoustic [11], [12], [34], [53], [55], [134],
[153] emissions. For example, Park et al. noted that saturation
attacks can be detected simply “by checking whether the light
intensity exceeds the preset maximum level” [8]. Foo Kune et
al. [5] further investigated the use of additional (intentional)
antennas or reference conductors to measure the levels of EMI
radiation. This estimate can then be used by their adaptive
filtering algorithm [5], which was discussed above.
In a similar vein, Tu et al. recommended the addition of a
superheterodyne AM receiver to create a tunable EM detec-
tor [104]. This detector was shown to be useful in estimating
and compensating errors in the measurements. Other detection
mechanisms can operate with existing hardware: for example,
Khazaaleh et al. noted that “sensing fingers”, which are already
used to measure displacement in the y-axis, can detect large
displacements caused by resonance [129].
The question of how systems should behave once an attack
has been detected has large been side-stepped by many works.
However, Bolton et al. introduced an algorithm to augment the
hard drive feedback controller and compensate for intentional
acoustic interference [12]. The addition of this attenuation
controller reduces the position errors of the read and write
heads to within the accepted tolerance levels, and allows the
HDD to operate in the presence of an attack.
Another way of detecting attacks is to use machine learning
classifiers [149]. However, such classifiers can be prone to
false positives, and will miss precise waveform injections. As
a result, it is often necessary to look for artifacts that would
not be present during the normal operation of a sensor, such as
harmonics and low or high frequency components [11], [44],
[55], [134], [153]. This might not always be as straightforward
as simply detecting energy at low or high frequencies that are
only present due to non-linearities: for sophisticated attackers,
defense mechanisms need to exploit the properties of the
legitimate signal itself. For example, Roy et al. showed that
“voice signals exhibit well-understood patterns of fundamental
frequencies”, which are not present in attacks and environ-
mental noise. As a result, they can be used to detect acoustic
commands generated by ultrasound signals [55]. Similarly, the
absolute refractory period is hard for an attacker to spoof
precisely via EM injections [5]. This period represents the
time span after a contraction during which the cardiac tissue
will not contract again. As shown by Foo Kune et al. [5], it can
be used to distinguish between a real and adversarial signals.
Finally, more restrictive processing of sensor data can also
help mitigate signal injection attacks. For example, safe de-
faults when the sensor output is deemed as untrustworthy [5],
[8] can reduce the effects of successful attacks on health-
and safety-critical actions taken by systems. Similarly, less
permissive choices in the design of voice interfaces can
prevent non-targeted attacks from succeeding. As an example,
adding voice authentication and custom keywords can prevent
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command injections into smartphones [38], [40], [44].
Observation 4: Until more resilient components
replace vulnerable ones, defense-in-depth is necessary
to protect against signal injection attacks. This can be
accomplished through better filtering and shielding to
prevent attacks, and through better sampling, fusion,
and anomaly detection algorithms to identify them.
B. Other Defensive Approaches
As out-of-band signal injection attacks are closely con-
nected with different areas of research (Section X), there
is extensive overlap in the proposed countermeasures. For
example, before Foo Kune et al. [5] proposed an adversarial
EMI detector, Wan et al. [154], [155] introduced a similar
design to “increase the immunity of a microcontroller-based
system in a complex electromagnetic environment”. Moreover,
to protect against LiDAR attacks, Shin et al. proposed sensor
fusion and redundancy, fail-safe defaults, better shielding (by
reducing receiving angle), and randomized pinging directions
and waveforms [31]. Similarly, Davidson et al. proposed sen-
sor fusion and an improved optical flow algorithm to protect
against optical in-band sensor spoofing [52]. Moreover, Blue
et al. detected (audible) command injections by identifying a
frequency band which is produced by electronic speakers, but
is absent in human speech [153]. In fact, detecting unique fea-
tures of the sensed property is a common defense mechanism
for general sensor manipulation attacks, such as those against
Smart Grid power plants [156], [157], or unmanned aircraft
systems [148]. However, such approaches require a theoretical
system model, and assume an adversary who cannot inject data
obeying this model.
Observation 5: Defense mechanisms for in-band
attacks, excessive environmental noise, and faulty sen-
sors are often directly applicable to out-of-band signal
injection attacks and vice versa.
In a different strand of research, Redouté and Richelli have
proposed some guidelines for improving immunity against
EM interference attacks [158], [159]. These recommendations
could be applied in the context of general out-of-band attacks:
1) Filter induced signals before the non-linear device. This
suggestion is not limited to amplifiers, but can be used
in other setups, including power transistors [160]. It has
been shown to result in an up to a 12.5× reduction in
EMI-induced offsets [158], [161], [162], but may require
bulky passive components, adding noise to the circuit.
2) Linearize the stage generating the DC shift, for example,
by using amplifiers with a wider common mode input
range, resulting in better linear behavior [163].
3) Prevent the accumulation of DC shift, for instance
by addressing the slew rate asymmetry and parasitic
capacitances [164]–[166].
4) Compensate and remove the induced offset, for example,
using cross-connected differential pairs [165].
As discussing all possible EMI-resistant amplifier designs is
out-of-scope, the interested reader should refer to various
comparative works [166]–[168] as a starting point. Similarly,
one should refer to advances in gyroscopic technologies [124],
[169], [170] which do not use MEMS constructions, or re-
duce sensitivity to random vibrations: as Khazaaleh et al.
noted [129], removing the “misalignment between the sensing
and driving axes” will make systems more secure against out-
of-band acoustic attacks.
Observation 6: More accurate and sensitive hardware
that is robust to environmental influences is a natural
defense mechanism against out-of-band attacks.
X. ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
As this study contains the first survey of out-of-band signal
injection attacks, this section shows the close connections
with side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference.
For example, using insights into the resonant frequencies of
gyroscopes, Farshteindiker et al. showed that unprivileged
websites could act as covert channel receivers, even at very
low sampling frequencies of 20Hz [171]. Block et al. im-
proved the design by not requiring external equipment for
the attack, instead relying on the smartphone’s speaker and
accelerometer [172]. Matyunin et al. then used the same effect
for cross-device tracking using ultrasonic transmissions at or
near the resonant frequencies of gyroscopes [173]. Moreover,
Michalevsky et al. showed that MEMS gyroscope measure-
ments are sensitive to acoustic signals in their vicinity [174].
As a result, they can be used to distinguish between different
speakers, and, in part, the content of the speech [174] due to
conducted vibrations of the loudspeakers used [175], [176].
In other words, the same source of vulnerability which
can be used to destabilize [10] and control [13], [34], [43]
gyroscopes and accelerometers can be used for covert channel
communication [171], [172], tracking [173], and speaker iden-
tification [174], [175]. Similarly, instead of using microphone
non-linearities for command injections [11], [55], [134], Shen
et al. [177] and Chen et al. [178] leveraged them to protect
users’ privacy by jamming nearby recording devices.
The countermeasures proposed in the works above mirror
those of Section IX-A, and include anti-aliasing filters, shield-
ing, and sensor fusion. Moreover, suggestions to increase noise
in side- and regular-channel emissions parallel out-of-band
defense mechanisms based on reducing the sampling accuracy.
For example, decreasing “the fidelity of the input audio”
can prevent against inaudible voice injection attacks [136].
Similarly, fonts which minimize emissions at high frequen-
cies [179]–[181] exploit the human eye sensitivity to “low
spatial frequencies” [179]. As EM emanations of video display
units (“TEMPEST”) [182]–[184] mostly convey “the high-
frequency part of the video signal” [179], images are trans-
formed in a way that is almost transparent to human viewers,
but prevents the reconstruction from side-channel listeners.
Researchers have likewise shown that adding certain patterns
to video frames [185] or the flashing of LED lights [186]
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can reduce the fidelity of reconstructed images from camera
recordings, while not influencing regular viewers as much.
Finally, in some respects, anomaly detection resembles sta-
tistical and machine learning approaches to detect covert
channels, and can therefore draw inspiration from seemingly
unrelated disciplines, such as timing and storage network
covert channels [187].
Observation 7: The sources of vulnerabilities for
out-of-band signal injection attacks are often the same
as those for hardware-based covert- and side-channel
attacks. This allows the same techniques to be reused
for attacks and defenses across disciplines.
Other research has indicated that devices which are typically
used as actuators can actually effectively function as sensors.
LEDs can function as photodiodes [138], while speakers [188]
and HDDs [189] can both be converted into microphones.
Although all three attacks have so-far required the assistance
of malware, further research is required to identify the impli-
cations for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
Observation 8: Reuse of off-the-shelf equipment in
unconventional setups expands the surface for signal
injection attacks exploiting hardware imperfections.
The lines between electromagnetic interference and out-of-
band signal injection attacks are also blurred. This is in part
because the self-classification of attacks depends primarily on
the research community with which an author is aligned, rather
than the end result of the injection. For example, the voice
injection command attacks of Kasmi and Lopes Esteves [38],
[40] are categorized by their authors as Intentional Electro-
magnetic Interference (IEMI) attacks, despite the relatively
low power used, and the lack of upsets or destruction of
equipment. Similarly, Osuka et al. considered their work to
be in the IEMI realm [42], even though they biased the
randomness of a TRNG. This fact also partially explains why
research on out-of-band attacks against TRNGs has largely
ignored attacks against other targets and vice versa.
In general, this mismatch of expectations often results in
unexplored avenues of research, as can be seen, for example,
in the IEMI attacks on UAVs of Lopes Esteves et al. [190]:
although there is a strong inverse correlation between the
battery temperature reading and the strength of the electric
field, the authors do not further investigate how to precisely
control the sensor output. Moreover, as was explained in
Section IX-B, research into electromagnetic interference can
provide insights into how to build more resilient hardware,
even when the hardware is only tested against “unintentional
parasitic signals and does not take a malicious behavior of an
attacker into account” [40].
Observation 9: The proposed terminology based on
the outcome rather than the method of injection can
help systematize attack and defense approaches, and
reveal previously unexplored connections.
XI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite the amount of research conducted on out-of-band
signal injection attacks, there is no common methodology to
evaluate how susceptible systems are to them. This is in con-
trast to related disciplines, such as side-channel analysis [75],
direct power injection and near-field scan immunity [59], fault
injection attacks [4], and IEMI attacks [191]. Indeed, although
many papers sweep through frequencies to find the resonant
ones [5], [13], some do not adopt this terminology [10], [12],
[53], and do not specify how wide the frequency steps should
be. This proves to be particularly problematic, as some attack
windows “are as narrow as a few Hertz” [53].
Recently, Tu et al. [43] provided a more detailed methodol-
ogy for acoustic injection attacks, which starts with a profiling
stage. During this phase, single-tone sounds are transmitted,
and are swept at an interval of 10Hz. The devices targeted
remain stationary during the profiling stage. Further incre-
ments of 1Hz or smaller can be used near the resonant
frequencies to estimate the sampling frequency of the ADC,
and account for its drift. The next stage involves synchronizing
to a frequency which is close to a multiple of the ADC
sampling rate. This step is followed by manipulating the attack
parameters, and adjusting them in response to drifts. Although
this approach provides some common ground for evaluation,
several questions remain unanswered, especially when assess-
ing countermeasures to claim that a system is secure. These
questions include: what the frequency range itself should be;
what the step should be for wide ranges; what modulation
method to use and with what parameters; and whether there
are other factors that would need to be examined during
experimentation. For instance, for electromagnetic attacks, the
incident angle of the EM field and the distance of attacks can
have a profound impact on their success, especially as they
relate to generalizing from the near- to the far-field.
Observation 10: A precise experimental procedure
which specifies sweep, modulation, and other parame-
ters is needed for out-of-band signal injection attacks.
The question of the maximum feasible attack distance has
mostly been of theoretical interest, with practical attacks often
limited to a few centimeters. Even though EM attacks should
in theory have a longer range than acoustic and optical attacks,
the converse appears to be true in the experiments conducted
by the works studied in this survey (Table II). There is also
a worrying trend of assuming that more power and more
expensive equipment easily translates to a long-range attack.
For example, Tu et al. [43] claim that with more speakers,
gyroscopes can be attacked from an 8× longer distance, but
as Roy et al. [55] showed, doing so is not a trivial engineering
concern, if the inaudibility of injections is to be maintained.
Similarly, although Foo Kune et al. [5] claim that a 20dB
gain directional antenna and a 1W source can attack equip-
ment at distances of up to 50m, these estimates seem opti-
mistic: according to Lopes Esteves and Kasmi [40], a 200W
source is required for a distance of 4m for remote command
injections [38]. What is more, high-powered EM sources have
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the potential to cause faults in other equipment and be harmful
to human life. As a result, determining how to inject precise
signals from a distance is particularly challenging. These
problems become even more pronounced for magnetic attacks
on actuators, which have been limited so far.
Observation 11: Dedicated facilities and test equip-
ment for long-range experimentation are needed.
Note that as many of the systems targeted are safety-
and mission-critical, we can expect that, in the future, some
devices may be required to undergo a certification process.
Indeed, a CERT alert warning of MEMS susceptibility to
ultrasonic resonance [21] highlights that out-of-band signal
injection vulnerabilities are a concern for governments and
corporations alike. Regulations will thus pave the way for an
expanding industry around facilities and test equipment for
EMC immunity against adversarial injections.
As the currently published work often leaves experimental
details under-specified, reproducibility becomes a significant
challenge: for instance, as discussed in Section VIII, details
on the power used were often not readily available, but
required searching through datasheets. Moreover, the duration
of attacks was also often not specified. Trippel et al. [13]
reported that some of their attacks against accelerometers
only work for a couple of seconds before the attack fails.
Sampling rate drifts thus necessitated manual tuning, or more
sophisticated attacking techniques, such as those proposed
by Tu et al. [43]. However, without details of the function
generator specifications, it would be hard to know whether
some of the issues are caused by poor clock accuracy of
the generator. This problem is bound to become even more
pronounced when using Software-Defined Radio (SDR) and
other low-end commodity hardware for attack weaponization.
Minor variations in the construction of devices can also have
significant effects on the sensors’ behavior, and will potentially
impact the reproducibility of attacks. For instance, Dey et
al. [192] showed that otherwise identical accelerometers can
be tracked due to slightly different performance characteristics.
Giechaskiel et al. [44] recently introduced security definitions
to address the lack of directly comparable metrics describing
the outcome of injection attacks. However, the overall absence
of experimental details, coupled with monetary costs and legal
requirements associated with using the electromagnetic spec-
trum, make security research into out-of-band signal injection
attacks a challenging space for new researchers to enter.
Observation 12: Reproducibility through common
metrics which allow for direct comparison of the ef-
fects of injection and standardized experimental setups
are necessary to advance the state-of-the-art.
Besides the defense mechanisms of Section IX, to protect
future devices for attack, new security-sensitive products must
take a fundamentally different approach to trusting the outputs
of sensors. In the words of Fu and Xu, there is a need to “shift
from component-centric security to system-centric tolerance of
untrustworthy components”, perhaps taking note of advances
in fault-tolerant literature [67]. Fu and Xu also recommend
that sensor outputs be “continuously checkable by software
for adversarial influence”, such as through internal debugging
information that is hidden from accessible APIs [67]. They
further highlight the need for interdisciplinary teams and
education [67]. Indeed, until new hardware is deployed, many
cross-disciplinary solutions will be required to prevent, detect,
and mitigate attacks. As out-of-band signal injection attacks
become more powerful, collaboration will be necessary to
address the multifaceted research influences of the field.
Observation 13: Interdisciplinary research quantify-
ing the effectiveness of countermeasures is needed to
inform future hardware and software design choices.
XII. CONCLUSION
Our ever-increasing reliance on sensors and actuators high-
lights the need for a comprehensive look into electromagnetic,
conducted, acoustic, and optical out-of-band signal injection
attacks. These attacks cause a mismatch between a physical
property being measured by a sensor or acted upon by an
actuator and its digitized version. Out-of-band signal injection
attacks can be used to control or disrupt drones, hard drives,
and medical devices, among others, with potentially fatal
consequences on human life. In light of the importance of
such attacks, this paper took the first step towards unifying
the diverse and expanding research through a taxonomy of
attacks, defenses, and terminology. Our work revealed inter-
disciplinary influences between seemingly disparate topics,
and also made several observations that can inform future
research in the area. Overall, better experimental and reporting
procedures are necessary for direct comparisons of the effects
of attack and defense mechanisms.
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